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Abstract

This study observes the effects changing Indian relations had upon English
colonists in Virginia between 1607 and 1675 in hopes of better understanding the
trends that later erupted into Bacon’s Rebellion.
Authors such as Edmund Morgan have suggested that “resentment o f an alien
race” could operate to create bonds of unity and cohesion in a fractious society. An
examination of seventeenth-century accounts and court records shows that such an
affect sometimes did occur. In several cases—the Powhatan uprising o f 1644 being
the most notable— settlers put aside their differences and found unity in the face o f a
common Indian threat. This cooperation, however, did not always come easily.
Leaders used the threat of Indian attack as a means of coercion, crushing opposition
among settlers and enforcing leaders’ will upon the colony for their own personal
gain. Sometimes Indian relations became a point o f contention, driving a divisive
wedge between groups o f colonists. Dissatisfied settlers could even view Indian
society as an alternative to English rule and try to run away—a practice that colonial
leaders viewed as an attack on their authority over a united colony.
The key to understanding this confusing array of possibilities seems to be that,
although settlers (and especially their leaders) operated upon the belief that the colony
ought to have a single, unified Indian policy, in practice, different interest groups
viewed the Indians in different ways. The result was a recurring contest to enforce a
consistent policy towards the Indians. Unified policies and practices could result—
but often at the cost of contention and conflict along the way.
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BEHIND THE UNITED FRONT

INTRODUCTION

A United Front?

Captain Newport had never sailed so far up the river that he would soon
rename after his king, James. His host, the Indian werowance Arahetec, (a “king” in
his own right, according to English accounts) was certainly familiar with European
metal and cloth obtained through trade with coastal tribes who flagged down and
bartered with passing fishing vessels. But probably not since his youth decades ago
when a few unsuccessful Spanish missionaries fled the region had the native ruler had
such an opportunity to meet or see a European at such close quarters. For both men
the encounter was tense, unfamiliar territory. But even though they had met only a
few days before and each was at the head of heavily armed bands of warriors, they
were already on good terms. Through gestures “to the Sunne,” signs scratched in the
dirt, and drawings on a piece of paper (after the captain had demonstrated the use of
the pen), these leaders had announced a “league of fryndship” between their two
peoples.
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But now, even while the ensuing celebrations were young, the fragile peace
threatened to collapse. As the two leaders feasted on roasted deer and nursed mild
hangovers from English “hott Drynkes” consumed earlier, word reached them that
two of their men were entangled in a shoving match by the river. Captain Newport’s
response, bom of years of shipboard discipline, was harsh and immediate. The onearmed officer “sent for his own man, bound him to a tree” before Arahatec and,
according to a witness, “with a Cudgell soundly beat him.” The thrashing lasted until
the werowance, clearly impressed by the display, “stept up and stayed our Captaynes
hand.” Later the Indian leader returned the gesture: after “sitting still a while,”
Arahatec “spyed his own man that Dyd the injury,” and gathering a posse of “dyvers
others,” chased him into the forest. They probably did not go far. Soon the
werowance and his men returned holding “cudgells and wandes in their handes . . . as
if they had beaten him extreamly.” The English witness who recounted this episode,
an aristocrat with his own aspirations to leadership, felt that in beating his own man,
Newport had been “misconstruing the matter;” the decisive captain probably
considered his actions necessary to prove his authority and prevent a stillborn peace.1
This 1607 incident calls into question the traditional treatment of Indian
policy as merely European attempts at controlling, “civilizing,” and sometimes
exterminating Indians. Just as much, Indian policy entailed ordering, punishing, and
even executing white settlers. The often ignored corollary to Indian relations was the
ways that it forced settlers to act among themselves. Jamestown, the first permanent
English colony in the New World, took on a character very different from what it
would have been had the settlers somehow landed in a land empty of native

inhabitants. The presence of the Indians forced the English to make a host of
decisions. Indirectly, the Indians accounted for the rude forts the settlers hastily
erected and hid in, the guns they carried, and the cumbersome chestplates they wore
in the hot Virginia summers. Because of the Indians, laws regulated where settlers
could travel, with whom they could trade or truck, and even how they buried their
dead. Seemingly unrelated agricultural choices such as what crops to plant and how
many fields to plow can be traced to the state o f Indian affairs. Eventually, what the
settlements became depended in part upon what the colonists wanted to be, or appear
to be, to the Indians. Yet the answers to such questions of community identity were
never simple or readily agreed upon. In early seventeenth-century Virginia, where
control was always a problem, regulating such identity became one of the chief issues
for authorities. The question of what to do because of the Indians could bind the
colonists together or drive them apart.2
Perhaps the best demonstration o f the divisive potential of Indian affairs
occurred in 1676 when a Virginia militia raised to fight Susquehanock raiders turned
around, marched east, and sacked the capital of Jamestown instead. In what came to
be known as Bacon’s Rebellion, English settlers, rather than attacking Indians, spent
the bulk of their efforts spilling each other’s blood over who would fight the natives
and how. Although the time-frame o f this thesis does not encompass that conflict, in
many ways this study is a backward-looking attempt to understand the precedents for
how such a crisis over the Indians could become a rallying cry for social reform and
unleash dissention at every level of society. Other historians, notably Darrett Rutman
and William Shea, have already pointed out how Indian tensions made necessary and
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lent importance to the militia, the institution that later became a vehicle for violent
protest in 1676 and more famously a century later. But although militias may have
been the tool that made tension concrete and bloody, by themselves these institutions
were not the cause of conflict. Instead, when looking for the motive behind problems
of consensus in seventeenth-century Virginia, it often makes sense to look at the
divisive effect among the English of a host o f “Indian questions” that had no simple
answers.3
Yet, at the same time, simply blaming the Indians for internal divisions among
the settlers runs counter to the expectation that groups define themselves and gain
cohesiveness by recognizing and excluding others based on differences of race, class,
gender, or ethnicity. From the colonists’ perspective, the Indians who seemed so
alien and recalcitrant towards English “civilization” often played the role of such
outsiders. In the face of hostile native opposition to colonial expansion, xenophobic
English settlers frequently turned to fellow settlers who shared the same cultural,
ethnic, and racial background as natural allies. Thus in 1644, when colonists were
beginning to feel the reverberations o f civil war in England, a settler wrote that a
sudden sneak attack by the Powhatan confederacy eased tensions among the English
in Virginia and “did divert a great mischief that was growing among us.” In this
instance, it seems that the “Indian question” unified English settlers.4
Such contradictions raise the question: Did the presence of the Indians unify
or divide seventeenth-century Virginia society? Paradoxically, the answer is that it
did both. Political theory draws a distinction between consociational systems, which
depend upon the willing consent of the governed, and control regimes, which can

achieve a similar uniformity of outward behavior through coercion and force. Jon
Kukla has already argued that a combination of these two schemes helps explain how
Virginia achieved a sense o f institutional stability and social order, despite the violent
dissent and capricious greed described by Bernard Bailyn and Jack Greene as
“chaotic factionalism.” This odd amalgam of consociational and coercive politics
probably touched nearly all aspects of Virginia life. J Frederick Fausz has suggested
that the greatest impact may have been felt in the realm of Indian relations. Images of
the Indian as a common threat, refracted and magnified through the distorting lens of
racism, often led to instinctive cooperation. Yet, because o f the potential danger in
Indian relations, settlers also felt that they had to cooperate. In the sense that
colonists’ lives depended upon working together and that they often had little or no
choice in the matter, events might seem closer to coercive politics. Moreover,
through opportunities created by interactions such as trade and war, men in
government and certain planters and merchants were able to accumulate real power:
the ability to enforce their decisions upon unwilling or hesitant settlers. Imposing
widespread policies through this power, however, meant overcoming, and on
occasion, violently crushing opposition within the colony. Such struggles, which
entailed arrests, threats, commercial warfare, and actual bloodshed, bore all the
outward signs of a colony divided against itself. Ironically, the colony could be more
obviously split while it fought to establish the common terms o f behavior that one
might define as unity.5
Thus, between 1607 and 1675, conflict and consensus regarding the natives
operated as parts of a single process. The presence of the Indians created tensions

7

among colonists. However, the idea that there ought to be solidarity helped shape the
form that conflict took. Men exploited and took advantage of each other under the
excuse that they were working for the common good. Tensions erupted in the form of
accusations that somebody was a traitor to an otherwise presumably cohesive colony.
Whereas settlers fought Indians or Dutch invaders hoping to either eliminate or drive
them off, when Virginians fought each other over what to do about such threats they
primarily sought to force each other into compliance. Everybody felt that the colony
should and would act as a single unit; the only real question was, on whose terms?

CHAPTER ONE

Early Patterns
Noblest of men, though tis the fashion now
Noblest to mixe with basest, for their gaine:
Yet doth it fare farre otherwise with you,
That scome to turn to Chaos so againe . . .
—William Strachey, 1612.

More than half a century before the first group of 104 settlers spied the marshy
spit of land that would later become Jamestown, the English jealously eyed the
exploits of their Spanish rivals long entrenched in Central and South America,
Mexico, the Caribbean, and Florida. Any Englishman who listened to sailors’ yams
on the docks of Bristol or London or read traveler’s accounts circulating in courts and
public houses could enviously repeat reports of New World gold and silver, wealth
that could entice eager conquistadors from their Iberian homes into dark Central
American jungles, high Andean plateaus, and blazing Mexican deserts. American
gold and silver made Spain the richest country in Europe and its fleets the target of
every ambitious privateer. Lured by such wealth, bold English captains and
adventurers attempted to create their own settlement in Roanoke, “Virginia,” as a base
for English privateering and exploration between 1584 and 1587. This narrow, sandy
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island on the Outer Banks o f present-day North Carolina, they hoped, would be the
first step towards tapping into the riches of the Western Hemisphere.1
But the glittering stories coming out of the Americas also had a darker side.
Along with tales of gold and glory there had also trickled back grim accounts of
bloodshed and tyranny. As early as 1555, translated portions of Peter Martyr’s De
Orbo Novo recounted to English readers tales of Spanish atrocities. These, however,
paled in comparison to the blistering literary attack by the Dominican friar Bartolome
de Las Casas on Spanish mistreatment of American Indians which appeared in
translation in London in 1583. Peaceful Indians such as the Arawaks on Hispaniola,
who had joyfully greeted Columbus with basket loads of fruit, were enslaved and put
to the sword. Andean peasants toiled in the silver mines of Potosi to fill the coffers of
a king half a world away. Most sinister of all—for the fiercely Protestant English— an
entire continent was being forced to embrace “damnable papism.”2
Therefore, in addition to being led by dreams of wealth, the English settlers of
Roanoke also hoped to prove their moral and religious superiority to the Spanish in
the course of their New World exploits. Rather than enslaving the Indians, the natives
would race to embrace English religion and civility and then eagerly guide their new
lords to nearby deposits of gold and silver or set them on their way towards a water
route to China. But none of this happened. Valuable metals were nowhere to be
found. There is no ice-free Northwest Passage. Maybe more important in the long
run, even though several favorable images o f the Indians emerged from the colony
through the writings of Thomas Harriot and the remarkably lifelike and humane
paintings o f John White, the harsh military bearing of the settlers quickly antagonized
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the native hosts and eliminated any chance of peaceful cooperation. Lacking food
when one of their ships ran aground, spoiling the contents of its hold, and unwilling
to lay down the sword to pick up the shovel and hoe, the military-minded colonists
depended on the com of surrounding Indian villages for survival. Increasingly in
such dealings, the settlers resorted to violence. One English colonist later admitted
that “Some of our companie towardes the ende of the yeare, showed themselves too
fierce, in slaying some of the people, in some towns, upon causes that on our part,
might easily enough have bene bome withall.” Such hostilities came to an ugly head
when the English discovered a silver chalice missing and burned a nearby native
village in reprisal. As the colonists realized to their horror, however, to retaliate the
Indians had simply to move away, taking with them their invaluable caches of com
and leaving the English to starve. Without Indian assistance, dependence on a supply
line made unreliable by the vicissitudes of war, weather, and finance left the settlers
in a precarious if not hopeless position. When much-needed supply ships did not
come, the colony and its inhabitants disappeared, swallowed up by the new continent
and its people.3
The settlers sailing into the Chesapeake in the spring of 1607 knew all this,
therefore they would not be acting upon this new stage entirely without a script.
Along with a letter in a sealed box to be opened on arrival that named the colony’s
ruling councilors, the men splashing ashore carried sets of orders and instmctions
from their superiors in England. These directives tried to take into account the
lessons of the past. The first, a “Letter of Instruction” from the king, shows how
much the mistakes at Roanoke and the moral repugnance towards the Spanish efforts
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led English adventurers to cast their scheme in a different light. Rather than exercise
brutal tyranny over the natives, the settlers were entreated by the king to hold “just,
kind and charitable courses” to all those willing to accept English rule. Moreover,
they were instructed to ensure that the “Christian Faith be preached, planted, and
used” not only among the colonists, “but also as much at they may, amongst the
salvage people.” 4
Desire for American wealth could be cast in the language of charitable
enterprise because of the effects the settlement would presumably have on Indians.
Speaking in 1609, when the colony was still in its infancy, the Rev. William Crashaw
preached to a London congregation in 1609 that “Out of our humanitie and
conscience . . . we will give them . . . 1. Civilitie for their bodies, 2. Christianitie for
their soules. The first to make them men: the second happy m en ” Unlike the
unhappy Indians who were forced by the Spanish to adopt Catholic idolatry, “the
people of America crye out unto us . . . to come and helpe them,” imagined the
famous promoter of English exploration, Richard Hakluyt the younger. With
Christianity and civility, discipline made the third part of the trinity. The king, in his
instructions, confidently assumed that once converted, the Indians would subject
themselves to “such sever paines and punishments as shal be inflicted” by the
President and Council of the colony. Eventually, settlers and civilized Indians could
live side by side in perfect, well-ordered harmony, together under the authority of the
king and his duly appointed councilors.5
A different set of instructions, “given by way of Advice” by the London
Council, offered a less rosy view of Indian relations. More than the king’s
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instructions, the council’s advice offers a glimpse of the intended nature of the colony
and the considerations that shaped it. A constant theme was defense. As potential
enemies, the Indians shared their role with the Spanish, whose j ealousy of its comer
of the New World was well known. Already Spanish troops had destroyed several
French outposts along the Atlantic seaboard. Therefore the settlers were advised to
find “a Safe port” far upstream some navigable river so that if attacked by a Spanish
fleet, “you shall from both sides of your river where it is Narrowest So beat them with
your muskets as they shall never be Able to prevail Against you.” Preferably the
settlement would be situated on easily defensible high ground, possibly on “some
Island that is strong by nature.” The final choice of a site on Jamestown peninsula, a
virtual island separated from the mainland by high-tides and a swampy creek,
followed this second set of instructions, but it was not nearly as far up-stream as the
council in London would have liked. Nor did their choice, surrounded as it was by
pestilential marshes, heed the Council’s advice to avoid “a low and moist place
because it will prove unhealthful.”6
The colonists probably ignored the council’s instructions to settle deeper in
the interior because of the danger of being cut off by Indians. Whereas the Spanish
were a potential threat, the Indians were impossible to ignore. On the first night after
landing, while the men were “recreating” ashore, some Chesapeakes crept close
“upon all foure . . . like Beares, with their Bowes in their mouthes” and opened fire
on the celebrating Englishmen, wounding Captain Gabriel Archer and a sailor named
Matthew Morton. Moreover, even though the London Council had advised the
settlers to settle far inland to avoid the Spanish, they too recognized the Indian threat.
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Taking it for granted that “you cannot carry your Selves so towards them but they will
grow discontented with your habitation,” the instructions urged the settlers to “in no
Case Suffer any of the natural people of the Country to inhabit between You and the
Sea Coast.” The difference was in the emphasis: the London councilors were afraid
that discontented tribes might guide and help invading European powers; the settlers
were afraid of completely immersing themselves among the potential native enemies
at hand. Either way, the imperative was the same: “if You neglect this You neglect
Your safety.”7
In other matters, consideration of the Indians weighed even more heavily. If
followed completely, these injunctions would force the colonists into a mold of
behavior designed to give the young settlement an appearance of strength.
Outnumbered, the English knew that in any conflict they would depend on the
superior fire power of their matchlock muskets, “which [the natives] only fear.” The
Council recommended several rules to preserve and emphasize that advantage.
Indians were not to be allowed to obtain guns under any circumstances. Even on
long, wearisome marches, the soldiers could “never trust the Country people with the
Carriage of their Weapons” for fear that fleet-footed and sticky-fingered Indians
might “Run from You with Your Shott.” To enhance the natives’ awe and fear of the
musket’s killing power, the leaders could let only those settlers “Chosen out of your
best Markesmen” shoot in front of the Indians. Otherwise, “if they see Your Learners
miss what they aim at they will think the Weapon not so terrible and will be
[boldened] to Assailt You.” 8
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In addition to emphasizing their military firepower, the London Council’s
instructions and advice urged the colonists to hide their weaknesses. All deaths and
sicknesses on the part of the colonists were to be carefully concealed. Assuming that
all natives considered Europeans to be gods, the London Council hoped that by hiding
their sick and dead, the settlers could prevent the Indians from realizing the settlers
were “but Common men.” More realistically, the writers of the instructions
understood that if the Indian population was large and knew how few settlers there
/

actually were, the natives could overwhelm the meager outpost with numbers alone—
regardless o f muskets.9
Such behavior could create only a mask of strength. Inevitably at first there
would be weakness. From the failed Roanoke enterprise planners had learned that the
young settlement probably could not survive without the help of at least some of the
nearby Indians. “Not being Sure how your own seed Com will prosper the first
Year,” the settlers were instmcted to “imploy Some few of your Company to trade
with them for Com and Other lasting Victuals.” Accompanying this realization was
the almost neurotic fear that the Indians would abandon the settlers. “You must have
Great Care not to Offend the naturals if you Can Eschew it,” cautioned the Council.
Perhaps they remembered an incident at Roanoke when a local tribe sent the settlers
on a wild-goose chase in pursuit of nonexistent precious metals deep into the interior
where they risked getting lost or destroyed by other tribes. The settlers going to
Jamestown were to take precautions against a repeat performance: “Your Discoverers
that passes Over Land with hired Guides must Look well to them that they Slip not
from them.” For a settler unfamiliar with the land the danger was real: in “that
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Country having no way nor path .. . if Your Guides Run from You in the Great
Woods or Deserts you Shall hardly Ever find a Passage back.” As an extra
precaution, exploring Englishmen were enjoined to carry a compass and to constantly
jot down their route.10
With such dangers in mind, shortly after landing on the peninsula where the
future colony would be, the newly arrived settlers set about building a fort—but not
soon enough. Before their defensive works amounted to more than “the boughs of
trees cast together in the forme of a halfe moone,” another band of Indians attacked,
mounting a “very furious Assault” for about an hour until fire from the ships anchored
in a deep-water just off-shore drove them off. Eleven men were wounded (one
mortally), and a boy killed. Yet one of the witnesses—perhaps remembering the
London Council’s advice to conceal injuries— added in his account sent home that the
Indian attackers “perceived not this Hurt in us.” Afterwards the men redoubled their
efforts and by the middle of the next month completed the fort. The final structure
was “triangle wise, having three Bulwarkes at every comer like a halfe Moone, and
foure or five pieces of Artillerie mounted in them.” Improving these fortifications
and building new ones as the settlement expanded became a frequent occupation in
the following years.11
These early works did not go uninterrupted. Before the fort was completed,
three Indians (probably Paspaheghs) sneaked into camp, hid “themselves in the longe
grasse” and shot an Englishman who went out to “doe naturall necessity.” It would
not be the last time that the English were caught with their pants down. Another day,
“some twenty appeared;” they “shott Dyvers Arrowes at randome which fell short” of
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the yet unfinished fort, and then ran away. The fear of such ambushes made
accomplishing daily tasks difficult and strained the manpower of the young colony.
Settlers hoping to survive lived constantly on edge; less careful stragglers were often
hurt or killed. Captain John Smith, the historian and briefly the leader of the
settlement, later complained, “what toile we had, with so smal a power to guard our
workmen adaies [at days], watch al nigh, resist our enimies and effect our
businesse.”12
The settlers, however, were at war neither all the time nor with all the Indians.
Even as some bands took pot-shots at settlers working around the fort, others
appeared who “certifyed us who were our frendes, and who foes.” Afterwards they
counseled the settlers to cut down the long weeds around the fort to prevent future
depredations. Other tribes met them during explorations further inland (including
those in the encounter between Captain Newport and Arahatec) and were similarly
befriended.13
The London Council had been right in predicting that the early settlement
would depend on Indian com for survival. By the end o f the first summer, supplies
had dwindled to “but a small Can of Barlie sod in water to five men a day.” With
famine came malnutrition and increased susceptibility to disease; the colony
threatened to waste away. Starved shells of men moved slowly among the bare
buildings or wearily manned the bulwarks; others lay in heaps, “groaning in every
comer of the fort.” In the morning, bodies of the dead were dragged “out of the
Cabines like Dogges to be buried.” Although Edward Wingfield, the first colony
president, claimed to have “hid this our weakenes carefully from the salvages,” other
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reports make clear that the natives were aware of the settlers’ plight. Out of pity or
desire to trade for iron tools, copper pots, and glass beads, Indians eventually saved
the colony from disappearing altogether by bringing “Bread, Come, Fish, and Flesh in
great plentie.” Soon a steady trade developed.14
Planners of the colony had imagined that this reliance on the Indians would
last only until the settlers could sow and harvest their own first crop. However, in the
following years, the settlers waged a constant stmggle to get Indian com. In return
for English goods, com became the chief currency of the Indian trade. When they
could not barter for it, the colonists went to war for it, attacking villages, burning
houses, and filling the holds of their small boats with the precious grain. When they
could do neither, they starved. John Smith summed up the irony of men coming to
America hoping to get rich and instead scrounging for com: “Men maie think it
strange there should be this stir for a little come, but had it been gold, with more ease
we might have got it; & had it wanted, the whole colony had starved.”15
Gradually, in dealings with the Indians for food the leaders of the colony
began to put their trust in Smith. The young mercenary’s experience in numerous
European wars and his knack for bold bluffs suited him for the task. His brief
captivity among the Pamunkeys early on increased his knowledge of a local
Algonquian language and gave him an acquaintance with Powhatan and his brother
Opechancanough, the most powerful Indian mlers in the area. In his own descriptions
o f the first year, Smith stated that he was appointed to “the managing of all things
abroad.” When the “Salvages brought such plentie of bread, fish, turkies, squirrels,
deare, & other wild beasts” to Jamestown to trade, he acted as the liaison between the
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two peoples and set prices almost like a “market clerke.” Even his political enemy
President Wingfield later confirmed that “Master Smyth especially traded up and
downe the River with the Indyans for Com, which releved the Collony well.”16
By committing Smith to dealing with “things abroad,” the president and the
councilors in Virginia (who were the leaders in colonial Virginia, as opposed to the
London Council) probably hoped to keep the troublesome soldier at arm’s length. On
the voyage from England, they even put him in shackles briefly for his disrespectful
behavior. In his dealings with the Indians, however, Smith proved just as irksome.
He disputed with Captain Newport about how many goods to trade for com. Whereas
Newport hoped to establish friendly relations through conspicuous displays of
generosity, Smith preferred hard dealing. In his own accounts (penned in the third
person), Smith reported that Newport sought “to please the humor of the unsatiable
Salvage; Smith to cause the Salvage to please'him.” Moreover, Smith refused to
follow the colony’s injunctions not to anger the Indians. Rather, he was willing to
“try such conclusions as necessitie inforced, though contrary to his Commission.” At
any “first meeting” with a band of Indians, Smith made it his habit “to demaunde
their bowes and arrowes swords mantles or furres, with some childe for hostage.”
When the Indians became “insolent,” demanding guns and swords in the place of
trinkets, the president and council “would rather be anything than peace breakers.”
The colonial leaders felt it imperative to obey the “command from England . . . not to
offend them [the Indians].” Smith, flying in the face of authority, “without farther
deliberation” hunted Indians “up and down the lie,” terrifying them with “whipping,
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beating and imprisonment.” Although angered, the authorities could not stop him.
Adding to the insult, his tactics seem to have worked.17
Rather than relegating Smith out of important affairs, the settlement’s leaders
learned that, with the natives’ com as valuable as gold, relations with the Indians were
the key to power within the colony. Whomever the natives dealt with controlled
access to the only dependable source of food, not to mention the prestige and
influence that came with brokering between the two strongest military powers in the
region. Smith records that the “President and Council so envied his estimation
amongst the Salvages” that they offered greater prices to the Indians hoping to bolster
the appearance of “their greatnesse and authority.” When the councilors began
intriguing among themselves amid accusations of hoarding and stealing food
(including “a Chickyn” and a “spoonfull of beere”), Smith emerged as the new leader
o f the colony. Throughout his presidency and during the confusion before, Smith
depended upon his relations with the Indians to assert his authority over the settlers.
Through the natives, Smith could bring food. Conversely, Smith constantly tried to
give the impression that without him, the settlers would have been destroyed by the
Indians. George Percy even accused Smith of directly using Indians to enforce his
will on the colony. When “a greate devisyon” left Smith “perceiving bothe his
authority and person neglected,” he invited the Indians to attack the offending party,
“reporteinge unto them [the Indians] thatt our men had noe more powder lefte them
then wolde serve for one volley of shott.” Smith’s own accounts mention the dispute
but say nothing of this tactic.18
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Smith imposed his own style of military discipline upon the formerly
disorganized colony, reordering the settlers’ lives. Although some of the settlers were
veterans of wars in Ireland and the Netherlands, others had “tender educations and
small experience in martiall accidents.” During the first attack on the fort, many
settlers were next-to-useless, “not knowing what to doe, nor how to use a Piece.”
After that debacle, Smith spent “six or seven daies . . . only in trayning our men to
march, fight, and skirmish in the woods.” After being made president, Smith set the
settlers to work upon the fort, renewed the watch, and formed the company into
squadrons. The settlement began to take on the appearance of a military camp. Once
a week, the entire company exercised and practiced on the level field just outside the
fort’s west bulwark, partly for their own practice, partly to impress upon the Indians
the settlers’ power. Training became a spectacle of English firepower where
“sometimes more than an hundred Salvages would stand in an amazement to behold,
how a fyle [of gunmen] would batter a tree.”19
Not forgetting the source of his own influence, Smith maintained careful
control over all trade with the Indians. A little-known incident reveals how illicit
contact was a threat to his authority in the colony. When Powhatan requested some
settlers to build him an English-style house, Smith, “unwilling to neglect any
opportunitie” sent three Dutchmen (who had probably been sent by the Virginia
Company as glassmakers) and two Englishmen to spy on the aging chief. But the
Dutchmen soon began acting like double-agents and, with the help of six or seven
more “expert theeves” who joined their secret “confederacie,” they smuggled “a great
many swords, pikeheads, peeces, shot, powder,” and hatchets back to the delighted
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chief. Perhaps cultural enmity had arisen between these foreigners and the English
settlers; perhaps they simply thought they had better chances o f surviving or getting
rich with Powhatan. Smith later suspected that they acted in return for the promise
that they should be free of his control and “live with Powhatan as .. . [their] chiefe ..
. free from those miseries that would happen [to] the Colony.” The treachery nearly
went undiscovered. When the two Englishmen helping to build Powhatan’s house
realized what was happening and attempted to escape to warn the colony, they were
captured and “expected ever to be put to death.” Only gradually did Smith and the
other settlers discover that equipment was missing. But even though they “could find
the defect,” they “could not finde by whom.”20
Meanwhile, two of the Dutchmen, Adam and Francis, instructed the Indians
how to use their newly acquired guns. With Powhatan’s help, they promised, they
“would not only distroy our Hoggs, fire our towne,” and capture the colony’s boat,
but would also “bring to his service and subjection the most of our company.”
Already, they claimed, many of the settlers were “agreed to their Devilish practice.”
Without even knowing it, Smith faced the threat of a small civil war with Indian
relations at the heart of the matter. The Dutchmen served as the point o f contact, able
to convey trade goods and negotiate promises of military support between Powhatan
and a small group of malcontents; they bucked colonial authority by circumventing it.
Smith had risen to power through similar dealings with the Indians; he risked losing
everything the same way.21
Before this could happen, the unnamed third Dutchman was caught “disguised
like a Salvage” lurking near the glassworks outside Jamestown. With the conspiracy
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revealed, there began a long confused period of threats and violence between the
Powhatans and the English over the fate of Adam and Francis. The English took
Indians hostage and burned their houses; Powhatan complained that the Dutchmen
were unwilling to return and that, even if wanted, the “stout” traitors could not be
lugged fifty miles to the Jamestown on his men’s backs. Smith sent a Swiss
craftsman with pardons to regain them, but the envoy switched sides. Two of the
Dutchmen’s compatriots double-crossed their allies and promised to walk the rebels
into an ambush. A different pair o f angry gentlemen swore to cut the troublemakers’
throats “before the face o f Powhatan,” only to fall into bickering when they got there.
Confusion reigned.22
Eventually, Powhatan, sensing that things were out of control, tried to wash
his hands of the entire matter. He sent messengers “to signifie that it was not his fault
to detaine them, nor hinder [Smith’s] men from executing his command: nor did he,
nor would he maintaine them or any, to occasion his displeasure.” The situation was
brought further under control when supplies purchased from a passing fishing vessel
relieved some of the tension among the settlers. Francis and Adam stayed with
Powhatan for a time hiding from the punishment that surely awaited them, but
eventually lost their favor and were probably killed by the chief.23
In 1609, Smith was wounded in a gunpowder explosion and decided to return
to England. Even before the accident, however, the colony investors in London had
already decided upon a new government. Many of the reforms instituted under this
second charter reflected the changes made by Smith. Rather than a civil government
headed by a president elected by counselors in Virginia—a practice which Smith’s
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virtual dictatorship had turned into a charade—the colony would be led by an
appointed military governor. These new leaders were hand-picked, hardened officers
from wars in Ireland and the Netherlands. Under the new orders and instructions,
these governors were to make many of the ad hoc military practices Smith had
started—watches , armed raids, and weapons practice—into a formal regimen. The
Virginia company officials did their best to recruit the next supply of settlers from
impoverished veterans who were familiar with such a routine. Any other men who
came to Virginia using their own money were to come equipped with “sufficient. .
armour, weapons, ordinance, munition, powder, shot, victuals, and such marchandizes
or wares as are esteemed by the wild people of those parts.” This time, the company
thought, they would be ready.24
Because of delays, storms, and a shipwreck, however, there was a severalmonth interim before the arrival of the first of the new governors and the departure of
Smith. Without effective leaders, order broke down completely. The teetering
balance of skirmishes, trading, bluffs, hostages, and barely suppressed antagonism
that Smith had somehow maintained dissolved into an all-consuming war. The winter
o f 1609-1610 became the hellish period known as the “starving time.” Unable to
forage for food in forests and fields controlled by their foes and unwilling to trade
with the Indians (who were probably ready to let them starve), hunger reduced men to
eating their animals and then each other. Corpses were dug out of graves to be eaten
and men licked up the blood which “hath fallen from their weake fellows .” One man
reportedly “murdered his wyfe Ripped the childe outt of her woambe and threw itt
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into the River and after chopped the Mother in pieces and salted her for his foode.”
Battles with the Indians reached new heights of violence and atrocity.25
When replacement governors finally arrived and discovered the state of the
colony, they instituted a series of strict reforms that combined the suggestions from
London contained in the second charter with the violent tenor of affairs with the
Indians. This transformation of Virginia into a paramilitary colony culminated in
1611 with the issuing of the Lawes, Divine, Morall, and Martiall, which were mostly
martial. The colony experienced nothing like it before or afterwards. Under this
regime all the settlers were transformed into laboring soldiers subject to military
discipline. The colonists, who were “not only to exercise the duty of a Souldier, but of
the husbandman,” were forced to “leame the severall sounds of the Drumme, whereby
hee may obey that which he is commanded.” Military hierarchy superseded English
class structure: “All Captaines shall command all Gentlemen and Common Souldiers
in their Companies.” The laws even regulated matters ranging from the height of
one’s bed (one yard) to the disposal of wash-water (at least forty feet outside the
palisade).26
In practice, all of the colonists had to become trained troops. They learned to
look the part: every gunman was to be “furnished with a quilted coate of Canvas, a
headpeece, and a sword, or else with a light Armor, and Bases quilted.” Whenever a
company’s rotation on guard duty came around, they were made to wear full armor to
become accustomed to its weight, “least in the field, the souldier do finde them the
more uncouth strange and troublesome.” Every soldier-settler learned “to handle his
peece, first to present it comely, and souldier like, and then give fire, by false firing”
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and then snap to attention with “his peece to the right side with the nose up.” While
coming on and off guard duty, companies had shooting contests so “that every one
may thereby emulously contend to do best.”27
As the settlers’ numbers increased in the early 1610s, they expanded inland,
building fortifications every step of the way. Settlements at Henrico, Coxendale,
Rochdale, and Bermuda Hundred were built on river peninsulas which the settlers
could fortify from the mainland by building wooden barriers and tall palisades.
According to the Lawes, every time the gates were opened, the captain of the watch
sent out his sergeants to check against “ambushes or attempts of the enemy.” Then
scouts checked further afield for signs of Indians. Finally, only after all was deemed
safe, those desiring to enter or leave the town passed through in a single file so that
“they may be better discerned by the guard.” The governors considered such
precautions necessary in a land where “the devil and all the gates of hell [are] against
us.”28
Just as the governors ordered the building of palisades and the checking of
gates, the laws they passed attempted to legislate a fortress mentality. All contact
with the Indians was kept to a minimum. No settlers, even gentlemen, could “barter,
trucke, or trade with the Indians” unless “appointed by the lawful authority upon
paine of death.” Similarly, to hamper covert trading, anyone losing or selling his gun
“or any part thereof’ could suffer capital punishment. Settlers had to keep all “edge
toole[s]” such as hoes, knives, and hatchets in the company storehouse, from which
they could check them out for use. Indians who did come to trade were carefully
escorted at all times. Any who ventured into the settlements entered at their own risk.
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Suspecting that the “dyvrs Indyans [that] used to come to our foarte att James Towne
bringeinge victewalls [victuals] with them Butt inded did Rather come as Spyes,”
Governor Thomas Gates ordered “some of them . . . to be Apprehended and executed
for A Terrour to the Reste.” Guards kept a vigilant lookout to see that settlers without
permission from the governor did not even speak to such visiting Indians.29
As in Smith’s day, the governors saw running away to the Indians as an act of
treasonous rebellion. The punishment for nearly every major crime in Virginia during
that period was death, but in the case of runaways the execution was exceptionally
long and painful. A settler reported that Governor Thomas Dale, upon recapturing
some runaways from the Indians,
in A moste sever mannor cawsed [them] to be executed. Some he
apointed to be hanged Some burned Some to be broken upon wheles,
others to be staked and others to be shott to deathe all these extreme
and crewell tortures he used and inflicted upon them to terrefy the reste
for Attemptinge the Lyke30

Torture represented a new level of fear and anger directed towards runaways. Even in
the case o f the Dutch-led renegades who caused Smith so much grief, he had offered
pardons to men willing to return. Moreover, in previous times, settlers were
occasionally “billeted” among the Indians in times of extreme famine. Under the
military regime, even soldiers recaptured from enemy Indians had to prove that they
had been prevented from escaping to avoid punishment. Otherwise they were guilty
o f treachery by default.31
The government considered runaways a threat to their policies with the
Indians. By stepping outside the reach of English law, they endangered the very idea
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that the English were a single polity capable o f dealing with the Indians as a unified,
collective body. When they fled to the Indians, runaways might take goods,
especially iron tools, guns, shot, and powder, that were restricted under regulated
trading. Along with black market traders, who risked equally harsh punishments,
they destroyed the Virginia Company’s official monopoly on trade. Competition
raised prices. Illicit contact with the Indians also threatened to destroy English
technological superiority. Trades such “as Smythey, [or] Carpentry” that were
prohibited in the second charter from being “taught the Savages or used in their
Presence” could be learned from renegades. More dangerous was the alternative that
the Indians presented to strict colonial law. Life with the Indians could seem relaxed
and carefree to men whose lives with the English were ordered by the beating of a
drum and enforced by the lash of the whip. The prisoners whom Governor Dale
!

executed so savagely were said to have run away because they were “Idile and not
willeinge to take paynes” in their labors.32
However, not all of the colonial authorities’ efforts were directed at preventing
collusion between settlers and the Indians. In a period when peace and war alternated
so quickly, unrestricted violence on the part o f individual settlers threatened the
collective position of the English as much as illicit trading and runaways. Anyone
whose actions were found to have been the cause of a “breach of their league and
friendship” without a “commission so to doe from him that hath authoritie for the
same” risked execution. Similarly, soldiers could not ransack or “set fire to any
Indian dwelling house . . . or temple” without the “commandement of the chiefe
officers.”33
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Sometimes, however, when the air was filled with the smoke of burning
cornfields and bloodlust ran high, the settlers’ emotions threatened to spill over and
put them at odds with their leaders. In August 1610, a war party led by Captain
George Percy returned from sacking the village of the Paspeheghs. As soon as they
had boarded their boats, his “sowldiers did begin to murmur” because he had spared
the life of the Paspehegh queen and her children, holding them captive instead.
Mutiny threatened. After a speedy council, Percy and his officers bowed to the
pressure. “Itt was Agreed upon to putt the Children to deathe the wich was effected
by Throweinge them overboard and shoteinge owtt their Braynes in the water.” The
implicit compromise was almost not enough: “for all this Crewellty the Sowdiers
weare nott well pleased,” Percy reported, “I had mutche to doe To save the quenes
lyfe for thatt Tyme.” Later to prevent her from being cruelly burned at the stake, the
war-weary soldier had her taken ashore and speedily dispatched with a sword.34
In 1614, this period of warfare came to an abrupt halt when Pocahontas, the
daughter of Powhatan and a hostage in Jamestown, married John Rolfe. For both
sides the marriage was a face-saving way o f avoiding a final, mutually destructive
confrontation between the closely matched Pamurikey warriors and the English
soldier-settlers.35 “Ever since,” reported a settler, “ we have had friendly commerce
and trade not only with Powhatan himselfe, but also with his subjects round about
us.” Even the Chickahominies, “a lustie and daring people who have long time lived
free from Powhatan’s subjection,” soon afterwards made treaties with the colony.
Freed from fear of Indians and lured by the desire to plant tobacco, which became
extremely profitable with the introduction of sweeter Caribbean strains, settlers began
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to come out of their forts. In 1616 John Rolfe, returning to England, reported to the
king that since the peace, “our people yearley plant and reape quietly, and travell in
the woods a fowling and a hunting as freely and securely from feare o f danger or
treachorie as in England." Fearing that the colony would less easily be governed and
defended, the Virginia Company instructed Governor Yeardley in 1618 to ordain
“that no particular plantation be or shall be placed straglingly in divers places.”
However, large numbers of settlers, under relaxed rules allowing them for the first
time to privately acquire their own farms, took little heed and planted far from the
forts.36
The “fortress mentality” gradually gave way to less guarded caution. Shortly
after the peace, Ralph Hamor mentioned that the earlier “severe and strict” laws
necessary to prevent the “utter subversion and ruine of the Colony” were “now much
mitigated.” For several years, the harsh laws remained on the books but were
enforced with less vigor and violence. In 1617, a settler named George White, who
“deserved death according to the express articles and laws of this Colony” for “runing
away to the Indians with his arms and ammunition,” was pardoned. Similarly,
another colonist received a pardon for “Stealing a Calf & running to the Indians.”
Even though a 1618 law continued the tradition of restricting trade with “perfidious
Savages . . .lest they discover our weekness,” within another year new legislation
made it “free for every man to trade with the Indians.” The exception was servants
who, as potentially the most rebellious segment of colonial society, continued to be
prohibited from private trading “upon paine of whipping.” The punishment for
settlers who “purposely goe to any Indian townes, habitations or places or resortes
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without leave from the Governor,” formerly a capital offense, was reduced to a forty
shilling fine. Of the laws concerned with Indian relations, only selling or giving arms
to the Indians still carried the death penalty—but by speedy hanging rather than
torture.37
Not only did settlers leave the forts, Indians began to enter them. As both
sides began to relax their guards, natives and settlers mingled on a much more
familiar level. In 1617, Powhatan, by then an old man, went “from place to place
visiting his Country taking his pleasure in good friendship with us.” Not wanting to
give up all semblance of control over the colony’s defense, the leaders of the colony
were faced with the dilemma of how to react to the “better disposed of the Indians”
who “live and labour” among the settlers. Such natives frequently found employment
“in killing of Deere, fishing, beatting of Come and other workes.” Virginia’s general
assembly finally decided “neither to utterly reject them nor yet to drawe them in.”
Although “five or six” could be admitted to “places well peopled”' such as plantations,
large farms, and towns, “lone inhabitants” were “by no meanes to entertain them.”38
Religion was another potential source of increased interaction between
English and Indians. Hoping to “lay a surer foundation of the conversion o f the
Indians to Christian Religion,” every “town, citty, Borrough, and particular
plantation” was recommended to adopt and educate a “certine number of the natives’
children.” Finding that Indian parents were unwilling to part with their children,
entire families were invited. Governor Yeardley hoped that the plan would give “the
opportunity to Instruct theire Children” while native parents learned the graces of
English-style work. By 1619, the Virginia Company with the help of parish
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donations set aside £1,500 and more than ten thousand acres to create a mission
college near the falls at Henrico. Even though all these plans went awry, they
demonstrated a willingness on the part of the government to accept Indians— at least
those willing to convert—into colonial society virtually unseen since the first days of
settlement.39
But freedom to meet, trade with, and host Indians did not translate into a
complete withdrawal of the colonial government from regulating contacts. As before,
heads of the colony drew much of their power from their ability to speak as the
uncontested voice o f the settlers in Indian relations. Sometimes other voices had to
be silenced. On August 4, 1619, Captain Henry Spelman stood before the General
Assembly because things he had said threatened the governor’s power. Already that
morning, the assembly’s clerk had noted the “extream heat . .. later to ensue” that
humid Virginia summer day—enough to cause the “alteration of the healthes of
diverse of the general Assembly.” By afternoon, sweat shone on everyone’s face as
the charges were read aloud. A interpreter claimed to have overheard Spelman speak
“very unreverently and maliciously against the present Governor” in a meeting with
Opechancanough (the brother of Powhatan and eventual successor to power after that
chiefs death). Although denying “the moste parte,” Spelman confessed that he had
told the chief that “within a yeare there would come a Governor greatter then this that
nowe is in place.” This rumor, claimed the assembly, “alienated the minde” of
Opechancanough from the present government. Spelman’s words brought the
governor’s authority “in much disesteem, both with Opechancanough and the Indians,
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and the whole Colony in danger of their slippery designes.” There was no predicting
what “mischiefs might ensue from the Indians.”40 Amid calls for “several and sharpe
punishments” from “diverse of the Assembly” and muttered curses on Spelman’s part,
it was finally decided to demote the captain to the post of interpreter for seven years.
The clerk clearly wondered whether excessive pity had been granted in a case where
the court might “perhaps both speedily and deservedly have taken his life from
him.”41
* * * *

During colonial Virginia’s first fifteen years, the Indians and the English
became acquainted with new notions of power. The two groups each offered
possibilities to the other. From the settlers, natives hoped to gain trade goods,
weapons, and new technology. The colonists, for their part, sought food, furs, land,
and sometimes sanctuary from English law. Only culturally erected boundaries
prevented the free flow of these “commodities” between the two groups living so
close to each other. Colonial authorities constantly sought to negotiate, create, and
control these barriers; at the points where they could be crossed—trade, war, and
conversion—English leaders stood careful guard. By his own admission John Smith
rose to power by acting as the “market clerke” in dealings with the Indians; in a more
general way, all the colonial leaders tried to act as brokers with the natives. They
recognized that power stemmed less from what was said at the cultural negotiating
table than from who managed to sit there. Runaways and illegal traders risked severe
punishment precisely because they circumvented regulated avenues of contact.
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Through them, food, weapons, and chances at freedom from English control could
pass back and forth hidden from the vigilant eyes of colonial authorities. In addition
to the obvious danger of aiding and arming a potential enemy, such actions threatened
the claims that brought the Indians to deal with the English leaders in the first place,
namely their supposed ability to speak for all the settlers. Captain Newport’s “league
of fryndship” with Arahatec’s people meant nothing unless the explorer could enforce
it upon his men. Conversely, twelve years later, the “honour and dignity” of
Governor Yeardley’s “place and person” was “disesteemed” in the eyes of
Opechancanough when Captain Spelman hinted at the arrival o f a new head of the
colony.
This struggle to stand at the head of an obedient, unified colony in the face of
the Indians had profound ramifications for daily life in the settlements.
Simultaneously, the state of affairs with the Indians affected the ability to elicit
obedience. From the beginning, the leaders drew their men onto defensible river
peninsulas and fortified themselves from the mainland. Dependent on Indian com, the
authorities in times of peace controlled trade o f it; in times of war they led raids for it.
Colonial leaders organized the character of the settlement under martial law for
defense. Later, when war subsided, they exercised less strict control but still claimed
and were willing to defend their prerogative. By 1622, some leaders were even
beginning to believe that they could incorporate and extend their control over the
Indians. As they were about to find out, the Powhatans had other plans.

CHAPTER TWO

Lessons Learned and Repeated

On Friday, March 22, 1622 the Jamestown settlement narrowly escaped
destruction. Before sunrise, at a plantation on the other side of the James River, a
Christian Indian employed as a hunter and “used .. .as a Sonne” by a settler named
Richard Pace had shaken the startled Englishman out of bed to warn him: the
Powhatans and their allies were going to attack. Not only had the Indian’s own
brother urged him to kill his employer, but “commanded by their King,” Indians
throughout the Virginia settlements were planning to rise against the colonists. “By
such an hour in the morning a number [of Indians] would come from divers places to
finish the Execution” and wipe out the colony completely. There was not much time.
After quickly securing his own house, Pace had set off in his boat to row three miles
through the predawn darkness to Jamestown to alert the settlers there and to spread
the word to “such other Plantations as was possible for timely intelligence to be
given.” A few hours later, when the attack came, the Powhatans found these colonists
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of Jamestown “standing upon . .. Guard,” with cannons ready. Not expecting to find
the settlers so prepared, the Indians hastily retreated “at the sight o f a Peece.”1
Most colonists, however, were not so fortunate. Those in outlying plantations
received no such warning; nor did they have any reason to suspect the coming
conflagration. Ever since the introduction of tobacco nine or ten years earlier,
planters had been expanding their settlements farther up the James River. Having
settled as far as the falls, this growth encroached on about half of the Powhatan
chiefdom’s core area. Moreover, increased contact with English clergymen taught the
Indians to distrust the settlers’ cultural intolerance. Nonetheless, the Powhatans
carefully bided their time and masked these frustrations, leading many Virginians
mistakenly to consider the period leading up to the attack as a golden age of
Powhatan-English relations. The previous year, when Sir Francis Wyatt arrived in
Virginia as governor, he found “the Countrey . . . in a very great amytie and
confidence with the natives.” Symbolizing the supposed permanence of the peace, a
copy o f a late treaty was “stamped in Brasse, and fixed to one of . . .[the Pamunkey
village’s] Oakes.” Opechancanough, the Pamunkey leader and successor to Powhatan,
told the inexperienced governor that “he held the peace so firme, as the Skie should
sooner fall than it dissolve.” In this era of supposed goodwill, loosened restrictions
allowed frequent trade between the settlers and nearby Indians to develop.2
Therefore, on March 22, when bands of Indians arrived at scattered English
homes and plantation communities carrying “presents of Deer, Turkies, Fish, and
fruits,” the settlers, “lull’d into a fatal security,” let the natives “come freely among
them, eating with them.” Then, at the appointed hour, the guests turned on their
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hosts, leaping upon them with hidden knives, hatchets, or whatever tools were at
hand. Along seventy miles of both sides of the James River and parts of the York
River, small groups of Indians and settlers in isolated homes and secluded
communities fought small, desperate battles for their lives, unaware that distant
neighbors, engaged in their own struggles, could not help. Wherever victorious, the
Indians killed all, “sparing neither Age nor Sex, but destroying Man, Woman and
Child, according to their Cruel way of leaving none behind to bear Resentment.”3
By the end of the day’s fighting the Indians had killed about 350 colonists,
more than a quarter of the English population. The colony’s iron works at Falling
Creek, once the financial hope of the company, lay abandoned, the tools hurriedly
thrown in the river and its workers all dead except two small children who had hidden
themselves during the melee. A captain landing at another plantation after the attack
“to search if anny of the people might have lyen wounded whome he might have
saved and recovered” found among the smoldering houses little more than a few
chickens, a sow, a dying calf, and some “old Chestes and barrelles [strewn] about the
field.” Temporarily, during the immediate aftermath, outlying homes and fields were
abandoned as survivors fled east towards more secure settlements such as
Kecoughtan, located deep in English-controlled territory.4
The death and destruction set back the Virginia colony’s progress by almost a
decade. Yet even within a few days of the massacre, optimistic colonists wrote that
although “treachery and cruelty have done their w orst. . . this must needs to be for the
good of the Plantation after.” In the long run, the biggest winners during the ensuing
decade of war were a cadre o f new councilors and captains who pursued the conflict
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to their own benefit. Many of these leaders were relative newcomers to authority who
previously had been either absent from the colony or excluded from power. As late
as May 1623, the governor complained that there “sittes scarce one able and
experienced Councilor.” Six of the colony’s former councilors had been slain in the
uprising; many of the other leading men had either recently died of different causes or
returned to England. Filling this vacuum, a new group of leaders rose in Virginia
society. Rather than hailing from the ranks of the English elite, as most of the first
generation of leaders had (with the notable exception of John Smith), several of the
new men were like Lieutenant William Pierce who, it was said, displayed “a
Capacitie . .. not to bee expected in a man of his breedinge.” Historians have often
attributed the subsequent meteoric rise of these new leaders to their ability to wring
material gain from the wilderness. More important was their success in twisting the
resources and people of the colony to their own ends largely through their prosecution
of the Indian war.5
The attack actually bolstered the authority of the government and helped unify
the colony by bringing the settlers within easier reach. Before the uprising, planters
looking for places to grow tobacco had set up plantations placed “scatteringly and
straglingly as a choyce veyne of rich ground invited them, and the further from
neighbors the better.” This quest for new tobacco fields that had drawn settlers
deeper into Powhatan territory had also lured them far from the centers of English
authority to “live like Libertines out of the eye of the Magistrate.” “How is it
possible,” complained George Sandys, the treasurer of the colony “to goveme a
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people so dispersed . . . how can they repair to divine service . . . how can wee raise
soldiers . . . or workemen for publique imploiments?”6
The ensuing war against the Powhatan alliance reined in these far-flung
settlers, forcing them to quit many plantations to “unite more neerely together in
fewer places the better for to Strengthen and Defende.” Settlers fleeing destruction
congregated at James City and its surrounding plantations, Kecoughtan, Newport
News, Southampton Hundred, Flowerdew Hundred, Shirley Hundred, and “a
plantacione o f Mr. Samuel Jourdes.” Even “these are more then wee would willingly
have held,” reported the Council, “but that it was ympossible to retire from soe many
dispersed and straglinge Plantacions, and bringe of soe much People, Goods,
provisions, and Cattle to any one place.” Councilors hoped that by means of this
retreat the settlers “might have been better governed and have added to their lyves
both Comfort and securitie.” Thus, ironically, this terror-inspired exodus of people
from their homes was seen by many members o f the council as a “benefit.. . whereby
the people m ight.. . [be] better governed.”7
Having left their homes, retreating settlers found themselves, for the “safe
guarding of the people and their goodes,” carefully chaperoned by individual
councilors enjoying extensive new war-time powers. Reminiscent of the days of John
Smith, the leaders of these refuge camps acted like warlords, ascending to and
holding power by feeding, protecting, and leading into battle the ragged bands of
refugee-settlers. In return, the settlers’ “labors now for the most part redound to the
Lords of those Lands.” Although theoretically each commander was to “observe such
. . . commandes and instructions as he shall receive” from the governor, in practice,
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isolation allowed them to rule with virtual autonomy. Commissions granted shortly
after the uprising gave the commanders of the fortified plantations and towns
“absolute power and Command in all matters of warr over all the people” in their
respective domains. In a period of emergency where nearly every daily activity could
fall under the rubric of public safety, this charge gave them a powerful mandate. In
effect, each fortified settlement became a private chiefdom where a leader’s word was
enforced “uppon paine of death.”8
In addition to creating an opportunity to gain tremendous personal power, the
situation allowed the commanders to enrich themselves at the expense of the settlers
in their charge. After the initial attack, famine probably killed more settlers than the
Indians had. Most of the colony’s grain was either destroyed by marauding natives or
abandoned by fleeing settlers. Even those fields that escaped destruction could not be
harvested before autumn, and until then the tall green stalks of com provided
excellent cover for Indians, making farming a deadly chore. During this food crisis,
the warlord councilors cornered the market. Already during the winter before the
uprising, a shortage of com that had driven prices up to as high as ten or fifteen
shillings a bushel made trade with the Indians extremely lucrative. Even then, there
were complaints that the men with the necessary boats and money, “onely haveing the
means in these extremities to Trade for Come with the Natives[,] doe hereby engrosse
all into their hands and soe sell itt abroad att their own prizes.” Prices crept even
higher after the attack, reaching twenty shillings “for a bushell of Indian Come and
none to be had but with great men.”9
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During the 1620s, many o f these same leading men or their business allies,
through exclusive commissions, had their monopolies officially confirmed. The
commission of Ralph Hamor, typical of the period, mentioned that “it was thought fitt
. . . to restraine all perticuler trade for Come, within the Bay, and to apropriate that
trade, only for the publique benefitt of the Colony.” Hamor was granted “full power
and absolute Command . . . to trade in any River or Rivers within the Bay.” Only
several months before the commission, George Sandys had observed that “Captain
Hamor is miserablie poore.” Yet even while supposedly working for the public
benefit during war-time conditions, he sold goods at prices that brought charges of
extortion, and within two years he could be counted among the fifteen richest men in
the colony.10
The Virginia Company, expressing from London their frustrated credulity
about the constant shortage of com, mentioned rumors of men “Ingrossinge all” and
even wondered if “there hath been in some (in whom it ought least to have been) an
intent to hinder the increase of the Plantation . . . [for their] owne gaine and
greatness.” There would have been good opportunity for councilors to do so. Not
only did trade with the Indians keep money flowing directly into the pockets of
certain councilors, it also allowed those men to direct the efforts of hungry refugees in
their charge towards growing lucrative tobacco. Despite official proclamations
encouraging colonists to grow com, a settler complained that he would have had
“Come ynough if he might have ben suffered to have planted what he would” instead
o f being forced to tend tobacco. Another settler reported that it was made clear that
Sir George Yeardley “should provide them Come if they would provide Tobacco.”11
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In many ways, the line between warfare and trade during the 1620s was thin.
Two years after the attack, Governor Sir Francis Wyatt wrote in a letter that “our first
worke is the expulsion of the Salvages to gaine the free range of the country . . . for it
is infinitely better to have no heathen among us, who at best were but as thomes in
our sides, then to be at peace and league with them.” Occasionally, as when they
poisoned the wine of approximately two hundred Indians who had assembled to toast
a feigned peace treaty, Virginia settlers pursued this goal o f complete extermination.
More often, however, the war settled into occasional raids and “feedfights” as much
designed to capture com as kill warriors. A commission to George Yeardley
encouraged him to “make warr, kill, spoile, and take by force or otherwise whatsoever
boote of Come .. . from any the Salvages or enemies.” The mission seems to have
been a success: “in his last expedition,” reported the Virginia council, Yeardley
“brought into the Colonie about a Thowsande bushell of come.”12
The clearest indictment of this policy of bringing the settlers together under
the enlarged exploitive control of particular councilors is contained in a vituperative
letter by an “old planter” and a “private man” named William Capps. Although
praising governor Wyatt as “a Moyses [Moses], accepting no person, no profit,”
Capps recognized that the continued authority o f councilors like George Yeardley, a
“right worthie Statesman for his owne profit,” depended upon continued warfare.
“He will perhaps take the paynes to bume a few of their [the Indians’] houses everie
yeare,” wrote Capps, but by doing so Yeardley was behaving like a crooked “surgion,
that wanteth meanes” who prolonges an expensive treatment “to keep one in hand 3
yeares, that maybee Cured in 3 quarters, or 3 monthes.” When Capps, who had some
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experience in Indian fighting, offered to lead a mission o f forty men against the
Pamunkey village, his request for forty men met nothing but resistance and hesitation.
“Charitye first beginnes at home” he imagined the protesting councilors slyly
whispering to themselves, “take away one o f my men, there’s 2000 plantes gone, thats
500 waight of Tobacco, yea and what shall this man doe, runne after the Indians?
soft, I have perhaps 10, perhaps 15, perhaps 20 men and am able to secure my owne
Plantation; how will they doe that are fewer? Let them first be Crusht alitle. . . .”13
Even settlers threatened with being “crusht” by Indians were not always
willing to leave their lands and give up their unregimented ways for the protection
and leadership of the government, despite frequent orders to draw back. The
governor commissioned several officers to collect and “bring away all the people” to
James City and other secure areas. Daniel Gookin, however, “would not obey the
Commanders command” to withdraw from his plantation. Willing to take chances
among the Indians and thinking “himselfe sufficient against what could happen”,
Gookin, together with thirty-five men, women, and children of all ages, held fast
through the tumult. With so many people under his protection, perhaps Gookins
himself was using the war to strengthen his position. In other instances, the
government was more forceful in its efforts to round up the settlers. Mistress Proctor,
a “proper, civil, modest Gentlewoman,” disobeyed orders to retreat for nearly a month
until some English officers forced her to go, threatening that unless she came
willingly, they would “fire her house themselves.”14
Perhaps the clearest evidence of the exploitation in these relationships is that
despite the efforts of their leaders and the continued threat o f Indian attack, free
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settlers refused to remain concentrated together for long. They were eager to escape
the direct control of the plantation commanders and to re-establish their own farms to
grow tobacco for themselves. Moreover, eager to get the colony back on a sound
economic footing, the Virginia Company shareholders, and later the crown itself,
pushed for settlers to return to their homes—despite vigorous protestations on the part
of the governor and his council. As new tenants flooded into the colony, under the
pretense of protection they continued to be snatched up as workers on the individual
councilors’ lands in a manner similar to the way commanders had garnered refugees
immediately after the 1622 attack.15
Even though direct control over the settlers gradually diminished, the
commanders continued to hold considerable military authority through the 1620s.
Two military expeditions in the summer and one in the fall remained the general rule
as late as 1629. Moreover, the government continued to regulate trade to the northern
Chesapeake. Thus, compared to the formerly “libertine” ways of the settlers, the
colony achieved a greater degree of unity under the increased authority of the
government in the aftermath of the 1622 uprising. For a short while, dispersed
settlers were brought within greater control and reformed into what the council hoped
would become a more cohesive settlement. But at the same time this process also
atomized the settlement, breaking it into zones of domination under powerful,
virtually autonomous leaders. During all this, the fear and hatred the settlers shared
towards the Powhatans and their allies during the war masked and suppressed a great
deal of potential internal animosity. In desperate letters to his parents, Richard
Frethome, a company servant at Martin’s Hundred, complained bitterly of starvation

44

and harsh treatment in his new Virginia home. He cast the greater part of the blame
upon the Indians, begging, “how then shall we doe for wee lye even in their [the
Indians’] teeth?” Yet, the result was subjugation and exploitation of the less powerful
by their own leaders. Planters wishing fellow colonists to be crushed by Indians;
commanders discouraging planting com to encourage half-starved dependence;
officers threatening to bum English houses—these all reveal some of the hidden
divisions of a colony supposedly united against a common foe.16
*

*

*

*

Even though the wartime desperation for com eventually subsided towards the
end o f the decade, traders continued to sail their light pinnaces into the northern
Chesapeake to trade with the Indians there. As early as 1622, traders beginning to
venture into the upper reaches of the “Great bay” reported “hope of good Trade of
Furres there to be had.” Traders eager to maintain their bottom line and envious of the
peltry profits pouring into Dutch traders’ pockets, tried to add a beaver-fur lining to
their tobacco-cloud empire. Although this trade never comprised more than a small
percentage of the total income of a colony almost wholly dependent upon “the
stinking weed,” the dilemmas it created raised hackles among the highest echelons of
Virginia government and even eventually contributed to the overthrow of Governor
Harvey in 1635.17
Of course, no one initially suspected such a dramatic outcome. At first in the
aftermath of the 1622 uprising, the settlers were forced to turn to Indians of the
northern Chesapeake such as the Susquehannocks, Piscataways, and Patawomekes, as
the closest corn-growing Indians not closely allied with Opechancanough. Trade with
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these groups seemed to offer all the benefits without any of the risks of doing
business with one’s closest native neighbors. Safely removed from the conflicts of
daily life amid colonists, Indians of this region could be recruited as potent allies
against Powhatan enemies closer at hand. Even as the council was proclaiming that
its chief mission was the extirpation of Indians from Virginia, the governor was
working to build an alliance with the Patawomekes against Opechancanough.18
The far-ranging traders who linked Indian polities with Jamestown policies
enjoyed the profits of being middlemen and the autonomy of having an itinerant
lifestyle away from Jamestown. Above all, they worked for themselves. Although in
the early 1620s Captain Hamor and Captain Fleet were the most notable Indian
traders of the region, by the 1630s they had been overtaken by the stubborn, “subtle,
and fayre spoken” William Claiborne. Arriving in June 13, 1621, the Pembroke
College-educated Claiborne had quickly been designated as surveyor. Claiborne’s
real advancement in the New World, however, came after his appointment to the
Virginia Council in March 1623 (and later to the post of Secretary of the Colony),
where he stood in good position to harvest the fruits of the ongoing war. His first
plums came from stints as a military commander, cosponsoring a plan to erect a
palisade between the York and James rivers in 1626 and leading an attack against the
Pamunkey capital in 1629. Trade served him even better. An expanding network of
economic alliances that connected the merchants of London and Kent with
Patawomeke and Susquehannock hunters made Claiborne the fulcrum o f much
politicking on both sides of the Atlantic. After an initial 1626 exploration up the bay,
he gained an official trading commission and began leading full-scale expeditions to
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the region in 1627. Later, armed with another commission, he established a semi
permanent beachhead in the northern Chesapeake trade by briefly erecting a trading
post on Palmer’s Island, a spit o f land near the mouth of the Susquehanna River.19
Claiborne’s legacy, however, is most often associated with Kent Island,
where, shortly after receiving a license from the king to trade “in those parts of
America for which there is not already a patent granted to others for the sole trade,”
he built a more substantial trading post in August 1631. Situated close to the
Susquehanna, by which fur-laden canoes could be paddled, via several portages, from
as far as the Great Lakes and the Ohio basin, Kent Island promised Claiborne’s
London investors the “very profitable and beneficial trade that might bee had and
made in the bay of Chesapeake in Virginia and some other rivers ports and places
there or neere thereunto . . . for furrs beaver skins corns and other commodities.”
From his Kent Island outpost, Claiborne entered into a close-knit trading alliance with
the Susquehannock Indians whose fortified capital was thirty-five miles upriver.
Even though the Susquehannocks were powerful warriors and influential traders,
previously rival tribes had enjoyed better access to French and Dutch wares.
Therefore, when Claiborne began his enterprise the Susquehannocks were desperately
casting about for a European partner in trade. Kent Island was an ideal meeting spot
for the two groups, removed from the Powhatan wars raging to the south and safely
distant from the hotly contested northern fur territories.20
The island, however, soon became the center of a dispute that ruptured
English unity in the Chesapeake. Hearing rumors that the future colony of Maryland
would be established in the region, Claiborne had rushed to found the Kent Island
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settlement in hopes of preempting any claim to the post. Back in England, attentive
to rumors that the pelt trade could generate profits of three thousand percent, Lord
Baltimore also dreamed o f establishing the new colony of Maryland on a lucrative
foundation of deer hides and beaver pelts. Little room for compromise existed
between the two factions hoping to monopolize the same resource. The Roman
Catholicism of many o f the Maryland settlers insulted the sensibilities of the
Protestant Virginians and fanned the flames of hatred even higher. The Maryland
settlers, for their part, allied themselves with the Piscataway Indians, who, after years
of having “warres and incursions” made upon them by the Susquehannocks, were
ready for retribution against Claiborne’s native partners. The battle lines were
drawn.21
Already entrenched in the area, Claiborne was well-positioned to make the
first move. When the first Maryland settlers arrived, they discovered that many of the
region’s Indians “were all in armes to resist” because of a rumor, spread by Claiborne,
that the six English ships actually carried dreaded Spaniards, “coming to destroy them
all.” Making a more conventional countermove, the Marylanders had Claiborne
arrested by the sympathetic Virginia governor in 1634 for “animating, practizing, and
conspiring with the Indians.” After being acquitted, Claiborne became even more
animated against his Catholic competitors, believing that the Marylanders had “given
directions for the taking and surprising of his boats that went to trade and likewise of
his owne person.” Captain Thomas Young, a Maryland trading agent, thought that
Claiborne was just being paranoid and reported that the supposed schemes to capture
him were “only a mere supposition and jealousy of his owne, without any grounds.” It
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was true, however, that the Maryland governor did “forbid him to trade” upon risk of
having his ships confiscated. In retaliation, Claiborne threatened to “be revenged”—
even if he had to do it “joined with the Indians in a canoa.”22
This dispute spilled over into an already tumultuous Virginia Council. Ever
since the dissolution of the Virginia Company in 1624, Virginians had been nervous
that their estates, founded under the old charter, would be confiscated under royal
control. During the intervening years, as settlers continued to stake new claims, the
question remained unanswered and fears continued to fester. Therefore, when the
royally-appointed Governor John Harvey, who was described even by close friends as
“a proper man, though perhaps somewhat choleric and impatient,” announced the
suspension of granting patents for new land upon his arrival in 1630, he immediately
embroiled himself in controversy with his anxious council. Then, just when the
Council was already nervous about its land claims, Lord Baltimore set about
establishing a new colony on what previously had been considered Virginia territory.
Making matters worse, Harvey acquiesced to the plan. Something had to be done.23
The “strength and sinewes” o f the anti-Harvey faction that emerged was the
influential council-member, Samuel Mathews, a man with “bold spiritt, turbulent and
strong.” He naturally supported the Kent Island efforts of his close-friend, business
partner, and fellow council member, Matthew Claiborne. In Mathews’s mind, the farflung Kent Island outpost became a test case regarding future land rights. “It is
vehemently suspected,” wrote Captain Young, “th a t. .. [Mathews] hath bene the
incendiary of all this wicked plott of Claiborne’s and yet continues to bee the
supporter and upholder of him.” Governor Harvey, on the other hand, eager to please
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Lord Baltimore and the king, opened himself to further charges of helping the hated
papists by supporting the Marylanders against Claiborne.24
In 1635, Governor Harvey announced his support of Maryland’s prohibition
against Virginians trading in Maryland waters. Shortly afterwards, Captain Matthew
Fleet, acting on behalf o f Maryland, captured one of Claiborne’s pinnaces near the
Patuxent River and confiscated the valuable trade goods in its hold. Enraged,
Claiborne made good his previous threats of retaliation. On April 23, 1635, several of
his ships ambushed a Maryland vessel near the Pocomoke River along the Eastern
Shore. In the engagement, however, the defenders gained the upper hand and several
Virginians were killed by their “cruel neighbors.”25
At about the same time, Harvey tried to arrest several of his councilors who
were meeting in secret to complain about a “dangerous peace” Harvey had made
“with the [Powhatan] Indians against the council’s and countreyes advice [and that] ..
. withheld us from revenging ourselves.” Harvey wanted to end the very wars that had
elevated so many o f the councilors to power. When he asked the Council to dispose
of the mutineers according to martial law, the headstrong councilors responded by
arresting him at gun point and shipping him to England. Claiborne himself was not
present to watch the stunned governor being manhandled because earlier Harvey,
“seeking to discover his practice with the Indians against Lord Baltimore’s plantation
in Maryland,” had sent a warrant to confiscate the trader’s papers. Rather than
comply, Claiborne “putting the warrant in his pockett, went out of the Colony of
Virginia.” Despite his absence, Claiborne’s cause was well represented in the coup.
Among other reasons for deposing Harvey—failure to communicate the Council’s
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letters to the king, threats upon other men’s estates, and the previously mentioned
unpopular peace with the Indians—the rebelling councilors noted Harvey’s
interference in Indian affairs of the northern Chesapeake. His policy of upholding
Maryland’s exclusive sovereignty in the region, complained the Council, left
merchants like Claiborne with “all places o f trade for come , . . shutt up from them,
and no meanes left to relieve their wants without transgressing his commands.” Even
worse, they understood “with indignation that the Marylanders had taken Captain
Claiborne’s Pinnases and men with the goods in them, whereof they had made prize
and shared the goods amongst them, which action of theirs Sir John Harvey upheld.”
“I doe believe that the [Marylanders] would not have committed such outrages
without Sir John Harvey’s instigation,” wrote Samuel Mathews. One o f the Council’s
first acts after nominating a new governor was to appoint envoys to “sayle for
Maryland with Instmctions and Letters for the [new] Governor and council desiring
them to desist their violent proceedings.”26
Admittedly Indian relations alone did not directly cause the removal of
Governor Harvey; however, problems stemming from Indian relations gave a certain
urgency and rhetorical flair to the complaints of the Council that made their coup
easier. Between Harvey’s alliances with the Catholic Marylanders and his recent
unpopular peace with local Powhatans, the council could portray their hated governor
as friends with all of Virginia’s worst enemies. By proposing peace with the
Powhatans, Harvey was looking to end over a decade of intermittent warfare— an idea
that outraged the councilors. There was the suggestion that all loyal Virginians
should be willing to unite against their Indian enemies. At the same time, the dispute
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certainly did not revolve around race alone. Even while some mutinous councilors
sought to annul the recent peace with Powhatans, Claiborne was seeking to preserve
his own alliance with the Susquehannocks against the encroachments of the
Marylanders. The council was working as hard to continue peace with the one group
o f Indians as they were to striving to continue war with another group. On either
issue, however, Harvey came down squarely opposite the Council. Unity, they felt,
had to be preserved, even at the risk o f treason.
s|<

*

*

*

In 1644, war again swept through Virginia. This outbreak in many ways
reenacted the same grisly script as the 1622 uprising. As before, the Powhatans felt
the pressures o f English encroachment, this time as claims north o f the York River
edged westward toward the Pamunkey capital of Cinquoteck, near the confluence of
the Pamunkey and Mattaponi Rivers. Once again the Powhatans and their allies used
the same tactic: coming to the outlying English settlements under the “feigned
masque of Friendship” before attacking from within. By 1644, Opechancanough, the
leader of the last Powhatan war, “had grown so decrepit” from the “Fatigues o f War,”
not to mention extreme age, that he “was not able to walk alone; but was carried
about by his Men, wherever he had a Mind to move, and his Eye-lids .. .[had grown]
so heavy that he could not see, . . .[unless] they were lifted up by his Servants.” Even
so, the stubborn chief, still as crafty as ever, was there once again to direct his
warriors, albeit this time in an armchair capacity. Also, as before, wartime AngloIndian dynamics produced among the white settlers a paradoxical combination of
unity and dissent. However, whereas the 1622 war and the 1635 ousting of Governor
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Harvey cast into stark relief the self-centered, atomizing effects of Indian policies
upon society, the latest uprising emphasized the unifying role that Indians could play
in Virginia colonial society.27
During the 1644 war, the settlers self-consciously tried to foster a spirit of
cooperation among themselves because they realized that the timing, if not the cause,
of this latest uprising stemmed from Opechancanough’s perception of the Virginians’
internal conflicts. John Winthrop, in New England, characteristically felt that “this
evil was sent upon them from God.” The staunch Puritan noted that the attack “came
upon them soon after they had driven out the godly [Puritan] ministers . . . and had
made an order that all such as would not conform to the discipline of the church of
England should depart the country.” In a sense, Winthrop was close to the truth:
although Opechancanough’s military strategy played a greater role than divine wrath,
English religious dissension did spark the Indian attack. Virginia was experiencing
the same political and religious turmoil that split England—divisions that
Opechancanough hoped to exploit. “They took this season,” explained a native
captive, “for that they understood that they were at war in England and began to go to
war among themselves.” This particular Indian claimed that Opechancanough had
learned about English factionalism by watching “a fight in the river between a
London ship which was for the parliament and a Bristol ship which was for the king.”
The Indians may also have received confirmation from a more direct source. Some
Indians confessed that Opechancanough “was by some English Informed that all was
under the Sword in England, in their Native Countrey, and such divisions [were also]
in our Land.” Split among themselves, and “having no supplyes from their own
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Countey which could not helpe them,” the Virginia colony, hoped the Indians, would
“be Consumed and Famished” after a single devastating assault. Opechancanough
realized that “now was his time or never.”28
The attack lasted two days, “allaruming them night and day, and killing all
their C attell. . . [and] destroying in the nights, all their Come Fields, which the
English could not defend.” Nearly five hundred settlers lost their lives, more than in
1622, but a much smaller proportion of the population overall. Then the Powhatans
and their Pamunkey, Chickahominy, Pasphegh, Warraskoyack, and Mattaponi allies
inexplicably stopped: they “fled away and retyred themselves many miles distant off
the Colony.” Perhaps the natives thought that they merely had to wait and the hungry,
frightened, and factious colony would collapse on its own. But this “little space of
time gave the English opportunity to gather themselves together, call an Assembly,
secure their Cattell, and to thinke upon some way to defend themselves.” As in 1622,
the settlers further afield in the frontier flooded back to older, more secure sections of
the colony. Moreover, once again some colonists, especially those north of the York
River, needed to be compelled by force.29
For the most part, rather than collapsing under the external pressure,
Virginians put aside their religious differences and came together to fend off the
Powhatan threat. “If the Indians had but forborne for a month longer,” wrote one
settler, “they . .. [would have] found us in such a combustion among our selves that
they might with ease have cut of[f] every man if once we had spent that little powder
and shot that we had among our selves.” War with the Indians took the settlers from
the verge of shooting each other and sent them fleeing into each others’ arms. Unlike
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what was happening in civil war-torn England, or even nearby Maryland, “we are at
peace among our selves,” remarked a settler the next year, “and have beene so ever
since the massacre.”30
Making it their policy to “pursue and root out” their “Irreconcilable enemyes,”
settlers began to mount the familiar retaliatory raids against the tribes, using their
“utmost endeavors to cutt downe the Indians Come . . . in all places subject to
Opochanckanough.” Once again, as in the 1620s conflict, wartime powers gave
government officials increased authority over the population; this time, however,
perhaps because of a stronger assembly more dependent upon settlers’ votes,
conscious efforts were made to subdue the opportunities for rapacious exploitation of
one’s fellow colonists. For example, with the “want of Come . . .beyond all
Miseryes,” traders again operated under public monopolies, but this time, the
potential for graft was severely limited. Laws made it illegal for com collected from
the natives to be sold for more than 100 pounds of tobacco per barrel. Moreover, in
order to prevent councilors from sending other settlers off on wild Indian chases
while they and their own servants busily continued to grow tobacco, it was decreed
that “wherein all persons whatsoever inhabiting within this colony ought to be
engaged in respect the preservation o f all depends thereupon . . . [ , ] those of the
C ouncil. . . shall noe longer exempt their .. . men from the charge of the said warr
butt shall equally contribute with the rest of the inhabitants.” No longer were
plantation owners to let their lesser neighbors be cmshed (even a little); instead it was
ordered that “the joyning plantations doe assist the fffontiers or theire Neighbours
upon Alarums.” Any neglect of this duty to one’s fellow Englishmen was “to be

severely censured.” Indicative of the greater constraints placed upon the powers of
commanders, who in earlier years might have emerged as semi-autonomous warlords
capable o f commandeering whatever they liked in the name of defending the colony,
the assembly decided that “if any of the Capts. .. shall at any time presse any
necessary tooles from the inhabitants for the publique service and not retume the
same againe . .. they .. .shall for such default be liable to make the owners
satisfaction for the tooles soe pressed.” Even court cases and law suits that might
deprive a settler from his “mans servant, his come, or Aummunition” and therebye
leave an unlucky litigant “disabaled to defend themselves and their plantations,” were
tabled until “when it shall please God we shall suppresse our enemy.” Cooperation
was the rule o f the day.31
Not that some councilors did not try the usual tricks. Claiborne, by this time
one o f the few remaining men who had risen to power under the old school o f trading
and raiding, was elected “to be General and Chief Commander” of a 300-man
expedition against the Pamunkeys, while forces from Henrico, Charles City County,
and Upper Norfolk launched simultaneous diversion raids against the Nansemonds,
Seacocks, Warisquoycacks, Chawanokes, and Tancks Weyanokes. Interpreting his
mandate to fight Pamunkeys beyond the broadest possible sense, Claiborne diverted
some of these troops for a doomed assault to retake his old Kent Island holdings.
Frustrated by his appropriation of public power, however, Claiborne’s fellow
councilors asked him “to surcease, for the present, his interference with the
government o f Kent Island” lest he “imbrogle the colony in further troubles.”32
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Into the former place of such over-mighty councilors stepped the recently
appointed Governor Berkeley, accomplished playwright, younger son of a powerful
family, and favorite of the king. Shortly after returning from a speedy trip to England
to beg the king personally for more arms and ammunition (the settlers having had
hardly enough to fight each other much less the Indians), Berkeley learned that the
aged chief Opechancanough was “some distance from his usual Habitation,”
encamped somewhere between the falls of the James and Appomattox Rivers.
Gathering a party o f mounted soldiers, the governor “made a speedy march, [and]
surprised him in his Quarters.” Berkeley became an immediate war hero. The high
regard his actions engendered made him immensely popular and helped strengthen his
over-all authority for the next several decades. Realizing the prestige value of his
captive in bolstering his own image of authority, Berkeley “hoping to get Reputation,
by presenting his Majesty with a Royal Captive,” planned to ship Opechancanough to
England. Before Opechancanough could suffer this final indignity, a vengeful English
guard shot the old leader in the back.33
Powhatan resistance crumbled soon after the death o f Opechancanough. By
October 1646 the confederation’s new leader, Necotowance, signed a treaty with the
English settlers that would form the basis of Virginia’s first real effort to create a
cohesive program for governing Indian-white relations. After laying out the
theoretical justification for English authority by forcing the defeated werowance to
“acknowledge . . .[that he held] his kingdome from the King’s Majestie o f England,”
the agreement created a new list of do’s and don’ts of Indian behavior. Reservations
were created, free movement was limited, and cross-racial contacts were curtailed.

Rather than merely dominating the defeated Indians, however, the treaty also set out
to control the victorious Virginians. Many of the treaty’s provisions and subsequent
addenda attempted to bridle English behavior that had been problematic in the past.
However, even though the laws prescribed one set of actions, in practice settlers
occasionally followed their own personal policy with regards to the Indians; such
choices often put them at odds with their government.34
The overarching theme of the agreements was containment— containment of
the Indians and the settlers to more strictly defined spheres. Recognizing a long past
o f troubled Indian relations stemming from personal encounters between settlers and
Indians, the government worked to ensure that the two should never meet. To this
end, “Necotowance and his people” were given an area on the north side of the York
River, which they “could inhabit and h u n t .. . without any interruption from the
)

English.” Not willing to completely divest themselves from any future in the
territory, the English allowed that “it shall be thought fitt” that with the governor’s
and Council’s approval and notification to the werowance, some English settlers
might eventually “inhabit from Poropotanke downwards.” Beyond this broad
exception, however, English settlers were prevented by law from encroaching upon
the Indians’ reservation. The English, on the other hand, allowed themselves the
“tract of land between Yorke river and James River, from the falls . . . to
Kequotan”—essentially the whole peninsula.35
The agreements not only set aside land for each group to live upon, they
restricted even day-to-day movement between the territories. Although whites and
Indians were both collared to their respective territories, the defeated Powhatans were
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kept on the shorter leash. For natives to enter into their former territories, now an
English preserve, they first had to apply to the commander o f one of several border
forts, announce the purpose for their visit, and then obtain a “coate of striped stuffe”
as a badge to signify that they came in peace. The intent of the striped coat was “to
avoid all injury to such a messenger and that no ignorance may be pretended to such
as shall offer any outrage.” Unless suitably attired in such a frock, a visiting Indian
hardly stood a chance; it was decreed “lawfull for any person to kill any . . . Indian”
not so bedecked. Although the limits placed upon settlers were not nearly so deadly,
their movements were also restricted. If any English were caught “contrary to the
articles agreed upon” in the Indian territory on the “north side of Yorke river,” they
could be “lawfully convicted [and] be adjudged as felons.” Exceptions, such as for
gathering lumber, were built into the rule, but for the most part the settlers were to
limit their wanderings.36
Restricting physical mobility was only one means of achieving the treaty’s
overall intent of hindering interaction between settlers and Indians. One reason for
the hesitancy regarding white-Indian relations was obvious: already twice before the
settlers had been surprised from within by Indians with whom they had grown overly
familiar. It seemed unlikely that the government could ever again fully trust Indians
in their midst. There were other reasons to limit contact between settlers and their
native neighbors. Until the widespread adoption of slavery (which was still
uncommon until the mid-1660s), indentured servants were the greatest discipline
problem in the colony. Servants who had already received their remittance in the
form o f payment for their journey to the New World and who could only look

forward to several years of grueling, exploitive labor, were often attracted by the
prospect of running away. Most often, fear of the Indians helped to prevent, rather
than encourage, such flight. Demanding “wherefore should wee stay here and bee
slaves and may goe to another place and live like gentlemen,” a servant plotted to
escape to from Virginia and make his way to Dutch or Swedish settlements further
north. Realizing that “there was never but one run thither and hee was almost
kno[cked] on the head” by intervening natives who controlled the forests, he sought to
buy “a booke to leame to speake the Indyan tongue” before he fled. A scattering of
other servants undaunted by the language gap, or perhaps even initially captured
against their will, lived among the Indians at various times throughout the century.
Even during the warfare of the 1620s, when Indian hatred perhaps reached its height,
George Sandys suspected that several of his missing servants had run off to join the
Indians.37
Theoretically, the zones of control created by the treaties would help contain
such flights. A 1647 proposition to build another fort similar to the ones built during
the 1644 war and described in the treaty, mentioned as one of its duties “to return
with all conveniencie the persons of all runaway servants and others, who shall not be
able to give a good accoumpt o f thiere coming thither without warrant.” The plan was
clearly not entirely successful, however, as demonstrated by a 1668 court case where
an Indian named Norwas, “who hath entertained a run away mayd servant,” was
ordered held by the Sheriff “in safe Custody without Bayle or Main prize untill that
they produce the said Mayd.”38
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The colony also continued the policy of restricting trade with the Indians.
Natives wishing to gather to trade were ordered to come together at specified forts
around the perimeter of the English-controlled area. Once again, this can be partially
attributed to an attempt to limit the excuses for Indians to enter the colony and
potentially catch the English off-guard. Just as much, however, the restrictions were
designed to control the actions of individual Englishmen who might throw the whole
system of Indian relations into chaos. The assembly complained that “the disorders
arising from a generall liberty [in trade] are many:” First, independent traders, by
issuing often superior wares, were “debasing and making cheape, vile and
contemptible our owne commodityes.” Secondly, the traders who engaged “in a
covetuous outbidding one another . . . consequently [were] enhancing the
Commodities of the salvages.” Finally, the traders, because of the “doubts and
jealousies by ignorance and mistake of language” have called into question treaties
and “may probably againe drawe a warr upon the Collony.”39
One need not look far to find the type of interactions that inspired these
restrictions. By itself, Claiborne’s sordid history of embroiling the colony in strife to
pursue his own trade would serve as an adequate reminder. Even after attempts to
regulate trade, incidents continued to raise tensions. In 1673, Abraham Wood, a
prominent Indian trader trying to expand his market to directly include the Cherokees
o f present-day south-central Virginia, lodged several weeks with the Occaneechees.
Resenting Wood’s hopes of eventually circumventing their profitable position as
middlemen, the Occaneechees trapped and killed the trader and several of his
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companions. Memories of this attack may partially have inspired Bacon’s revenge in
1676 when the rebel and his men destroyed the Occaneechee fort.40
The government did not merely want to restrict trade contacts. Past
experience had shown that any sort of encounter could have potential political
significance. In 1635 “certine Indians” sent by the enigmatically named “laughing
kinge” of the Eastern Shore came to the house of a settler named Daniel Cugly with a
message. Unfortunately, neither Cugly nor his friends could fully understand what
exactly the Indians were trying to say. As best as they could make out, the Indians
had brought a parcel o f roanoke (wampum) as recompense for an Englishman who
had been killed, but, wrote Obedience Robins, a puzzled and frustrated witness, “how
and wher I could not t e l l . . . but that it was for some man, ore other that was kyld I
well understood.” The men were put in the awkward position of negotiating a peace
for a transgression they did not even know about. Should they accept the gesture,
return the roanoke, or subdue the Indians? “For all the world I would not receive it,”
decided Robins, who then went home. The Indians stayed around another two days
then, “stoale away and left the said roanoke” with Cugley. Cugley subsequently
became embroiled in a three-way dispute over the valuable beads: he wanted to keep
the roanoke, other settlers wanted it returned to the Indians, and the relatives o f the
victim felt they should receive it as blood money.41
Despite restrictions, the government was never able to completely regulate all
Anglo-Indian interactions. Because most meetings were against the law, one can only
catch glimpses o f secret rendezvous through the records. When they do appear,
reports often hint as much at the arguments and tensions among white settlers who
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turned each other in as the details of the contact itself. In 1648, a settler named
Arthur Price complained that some settlers along the York River “above Skiminnyoe
doe dayly Entertayne the Indians in their howses both Day and Night contrary to an
Act o f Assembly.” The Court decided that if Price “shall at any time hereafter finde
any Indians in the howses of any of the Inhabitants . . . it may and shall be Lawfull for
him, [or anyone else] . . . to kill such Indians and to apprehend such offenders.”42
Not all unwarranted interactions entailed the settlers getting too friendly with
the Indians. Just as threatening were instances where settlers, letting their emotions
get the better of them, attacked Indians with whom the colony was officially at peace.
Despite the government’s efforts to ameliorate disputes, misunderstandings between
the two cultures abounded. Indians killed English pigs, cattle, and the occasional
settler. For their part, colonists looking for fertile tobacco plots continued to encroach
on native lands. It was often all the government could do to keep planters from taking
matters into their own hands. In 1651 a posse of men, contrary to the law, marched
against a group o f nearby Pocomokes hoping to capture or kill the werowance. In the
process they shot at the natives, beat them, took prisoners, and bound one with a
chain. As a result the region was on the verge of being invaded by a vengeful Indian
army. Hoping to prevent the uprising, the court ordered a hundred arm’s length o f
roanoke sent to one chief, ten weeding hoes to another, twenty arms length of roanoke
to the Indians who were bound neck and heels and another twenty to an Indian shot
and wounded by the gun-toting wife of Toby Selby. Moreover, the fifty or so
perpetrators were arrested and brought to Jamestown. In another case where
Wahanganoche, sachem of the Potomacs, was unjustly arrested, the perpetrators were
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fined fifteen hundred pounds o f tobacco each and forever stripped o f their civil and
military offices.43
By preventing frightened and angry frontier settlers from taking their own
initiative, the government found itself in the uneasy position o f protecting Indian
neighbors from its own citizens. Often, respect and loyalty towards the government
suffered in the process. In a 1660 letter to the court of Lancaster, William Berkeley
mentioned that “so many and so various have been the complaints to me o f and from
the Indians o f Rappa[hanock] river that I know not at this distance what judgment to
make o f their grievances.” His response to the crises was to “make a diligent enquiry
[to discover] what unnecessary injurys are done to the Indians and how our articles of
peace are kept with them.” Although Berkeley might have felt at such times that he
was counseling “humanity and Christianity” with such balanced treatment towards
the Indians, angry English subjects might consider anyone with such sentiments a
traitor. In 1661 Francis Moryson, who replaced Berkeley during the governor’s
eighteenth-month trip to England, weighed the dangers of supporting the Indians
against the wishes o f the settlers: “these Panick fears [of Indian attack] stop not with
the particular trouble of the authors but for the most part breake out into murmurings
& repinings against their Governors & ye Government for not following their rash
humors and immediately involving the Countrey in a destructive warr.” He probably
did not realize how right he w as.44
*

*

*

*

Between 1622 and 1675, contact with the Indians often brought settlers
together physically, politically, and emotionally. Twice, in the aftermath o f surprise
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attacks of 1622 and 1644, settlers had to band together just to survive. Because of the
Indians, Englishmen who ordinarily spent their days feverishly planting tobacco,
jealously eyeing their competitors’ crops, marched lockstep together to war. Settlers
who crowded the courts charging each other with slander and vilification huddled side
by side in fortified houses. Often tough frontiersmen who could agree on little else
shared a common hatred and fear of the natives. In war, the Indians presented
difficulties that, to be overcome, forced the settlers to cooperate. During intervening
years of peace, settlers acted more competitive towards one another but retained the
conviction that in matters relating to the Indians, they ought to work as a cohesive
whole, that Englishmen should stick together.
However, in practice, English camaraderie was not always natural, nor did it
stem from a harmonious spirit of cooperation. Often other conflicts arose during and
from the process of creating a unified front towards the Indians. Even as the settlers
were forced by the Indians to work together, to some extent underneath the
whitewashed facade of racial cooperation they were always, in the words Governor
Harvey, looking out more “for their owne endes then . .. seeking the generall good.”45
In matters of trade, expansion, and war, the Indians either directly or indirectly
affected nearly every colonist in the Old Dominion. However, the exact way that the
Indians influenced each settler differed from individual to individual. Whether they
were carving rough-hewn farms from the forests near the western falls or living in
well-tended tidewater estates, whether they were indentured servants or powerful
councilors, whether they hoped to grow tobacco, trade furs, or curry royal favors— all
influenced a colonist’s particular outlook towards the Indians.
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The problem was that, owing to the crucial nature o f Indian affairs, settlers felt
that in these matters they could hardly afford to disagree politely and go their own
way. Instinctively, they felt that as Englishmen they ought to cooperate. Moreover,
they recognized that any disunity weakened the colony as a whole. Trading
monopolies and restrictions on supplying guns meant nothing unless everyone
complied. Negotiating treaties would be all but impossible if the government could
not vouch for the behavior of all the settlers. In such a situation, nonconformity was
not just individualism, it looked like treason. Therefore, the trick was to gather
enough support or authority to enforce a single policy towards the Indians. Typically,
most settlers were convinced easily that their best interests in regard to the Indians
rested in unity. A sense o f racial and cultural distinctiveness contributed to this spirit
o f cooperation. Dissenting opinions, however, did emerge with the result often being
violence. If the threat o f the Indians themselves did not bring someone into line,
perhaps staring into the muzzle of a fellow settler’s gun would. Consensus could be
achieved through force, but in the meanwhile, until one side was victorious, division
would prevail.
Unity and authority on a variety o f issues could be trumpeted along with the
clarion call for racial cooperation. Religious disputes, for example, seemed less
pressing and could be put aside when angry Indians prowled outside the gates.
Similarly, a leader against the Indians often amassed broad authority for issues
beyond the direct scope of Indian affairs. Most often settlers willingly granted such
men power as an expedient to their own safety and best interests, but occasionally
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councilors and governors used the opportunities presented by the Indians to crush
their fellow colonists and exalt themselves.
Seen in the light of what had come before, the events of Bacon’s Rebellion
seem less of an anomaly than an exaggeration of previous patterns of division and
unity, coercion and consensus. The murder of a few settlers and the subsequent
misdirected retaliation against previously friendly Susquehannocks that escalated into
full-blown war was just the type of unsupervised vengeful bloodshed that the policies
o f the last several decades had worked so hard to avert. When the powerful
Susquehannocks descended upon the western plantations, killing numerous settlers
and frightening the rest, settlers remembering 1622 and 1644 sincerely believed that
their lives depended once again upon reaching a consensus and working together. It
should come as no real surprise that in this situation, Nathaniel Bacon, an ambitious
councilor, rose to power and became a military lord with broad dictatorial powers by
promising to protect society from its Indian foes. Nor could Berkeley, who had
gained his own start three decades earlier against Opechancanough, afford to step
aside and let Bacon usurp his mantle as leader against the Indians. During the
ensuing rivalry Berkeley and Bacon each branded the other with the label of traitor
because of their refusal to abide by each other’s strategy toward the Indians.
Although the revolution eventually grew to encompass a broad number of social
reforms, it was trouble with the Indians that initially brought the rebellious settlers
together and the belief that the rest of the colony should agree with their policy of
extermination that started them marching towards Jamestown. The Indian dilemma
thus acted as a catalyst for broader revolution by bringing together a previously

divided collection o f discontented settlers and spurring them to try to bring the rest of
the colony into compliance with a wide body o f ideas centered around but not limited
to Indian policy. Thus, one of the greatest “Indian wars” of the seventeenth century
toppled a colonial government and killed few Indians.
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